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ELIMINATING THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES
TEST FOR THE PUBLIC USE BAR UNDER SECTION 102(B)
OF THE PATENT ACT
MARGARET L. BEGALLE*
INTRODUCTION
If one of the goals of the Federal Circuit1 is to provide clarity and
uniformity in patent law, the Court has failed to do so for determining
"public use" under Section 102(b) of the Patent Act ("102(b)"). Sec-
tion 102(b), sometimes referred to as the public use bar, provides: "A
person shall be entitled to a patent unless.., the invention was... in
public use in... this country, more than one year prior to the date of
the application for patent in the United States. '2  Section 102(b)
works to promote prompt disclosure of an invention to the public,
while providing its inventor with a one-year period of time to deter-
mine if the invention is worthwhile.' In addition to the public use bar,
102(b) bars an inventor from obtaining a patent if the invention is put
on sale one year prior to filing a patent application.4 The on-sale bar
prevents an inventor from commercially exploiting an invention by
* J.D. Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology, 2002; B.S. Civil
Engineering, University of Iowa, 1999.
1. The Federal Circuit was created in 1982 for the purpose of reducing the federal
appellate caseload, eliminating forum shopping, and providing some amount of uniformity and
certainty in patent law. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 798 F.2d 1051, 1058 (7th
Cir. 1986); see also Joshua L. Cohen, Corporate Officers and Directors: Likely Targets in Patent
Infringement Actions, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1327, 1330 n.14 (1991). The Federal Circuit has
exclusive jurisdiction to hear patent appeals.
2. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994) ("A person shall be entitled to a patent unless the invention
was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or
on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the application for patent in the
United States."). Section 102(b) codifies both the public use bar and the on-sale bar to
patentability.
3. W. Marine Elecs., Inc. v. Furuno Elec. Co., 764 F.2d 840, 845 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("Public
policy favors prompt and widespread disclosure of inventions to the public, while giving the
inventor a reasonable amount of time... to determine whether a patent is worthwhile, but
precluding attempts by the inventor.., from commercially exploiting the invention more than a
year before the application for patent is filed."); Gen. Elec. Co. v. United States, 654 F.2d 55, 61
(Ct. Cl. 1981) ("The 1-year grace period provided for by Congress in [§] 102(b) represents a
balance between these competing interests.").
4. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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prohibiting the inventor from selling or offering to sell an invention
for a period greater than the statutorily prescribed time.5
Courts primarily look to the various policy considerations un-
derlying the bars in attempting to define a public use or sale under
102(b). 6 Historically, the Federal Circuit has applied a "totality of the
circumstances" test for determining if a public use or sale has taken
place that would prevent an inventor from obtaining a patent. 7 The
totality of the circumstances test requires the court to look at all of
the circumstances surrounding an invention, in conjunction with the
underlying policies of the public use and on-sale bars.8 The same un-
derlying policies are considered for both public use and on-sale in-
quiries.9 However, some commentators criticize the totality of the
circumstances test as vague and indefinite.'0
5. Cont'l Plastic Containers v. Owens Brockway Plastic Prods., 141 F.3d 1073, 1077 (Fed.
Cir. 1998); Articulate Sys., Inc. v. Apple Computer Inc., 53 F. Supp. 2d 62, 66-67 (D. Mass.
1999).
6. One of the first cases to deal with the public use bar, Elizabeth v. Pavement Co., 97 U.S.
126, 133-34(1877), set forth a number of considerations for determining public use. In
determining whether the bar would apply, the Supreme Court considered: (1) the circumstances
under which the invention is being used; (2) the intent of the inventor; and (3) the conduct of
the inventor, namely, if the inventor, or any person under the inventor's direction, used the
invention in public for experimental purposes only.
7. Cont'l Plastic Containers, 141 F.3d at 1077 (applying the totality of the circumstances
test to the on-sale bar); Petrolite Corp. v. Baker Hughes Inc., 96 F.3d 1423, 1425 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(applying the totality of the circumstances test to the on-sale and public use bars); Baxter Int'l,
Inc. v. Cobe Lab., Inc., 88 F.3d 1054, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (applying the totality of the
circumstances test to the public use bar); Tone Bros. Inc. v. Sysco Crop., 28 F.3d 1192, 1198
(Fed. Cir. 1994) (applying the totality of the circumstances test to the public use bar); Manville
Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 549 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (applying the totality of
the circumstances test to the on-sale and public use bars); W. Marine Elecs., 764 F.2d at 845
(applying the totality of the circumstances test to the on-sale bar); TP Labs., Inc., v. Prof'l
Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965, 968 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (applying the totality of the circumstances
test to the public use bar).
8. Baxter Int'l, 88 F.3d at 1058; Tone Bros., 28 F.3d at 1198; TP Labs., 724 F.2d at 968.
The underlying policy considerations include: (1) discouraging the removal, from the public
domain, of inventions that the public reasonably believes are freely available; (2) favoring the
prompt and widespread disclosure of inventions; (3) allowing the inventor a reasonable amount
of time following sales activity to determine the potential economic value of a patent; and (4)
prohibiting the inventor from commercially exploiting the invention for a period greater than
the statutorily prescribed time. Baxter Int'l, 88 F.3d at 1058.
9. See Edward G. Poplawski & Paul D. Tripodi, II, The Impact of Federal Circuit
Precedent on the "On-Sale" and "Public-Use" Bars to Patentability, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 2351,
2376 (1995).
10. Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 103 F.3d 1517, 1519 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (Lourie, J., concurring)
("With respect to... public use.... courts have been accustomed to referring to their
determinations as involving 'the totality of the circumstances,' a phrase that some have objected
to as being indefinite."); Seal-Flex, Inc. v. Athletic Track & Court Constr., 98 F.3d 1318, 1323
n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (stating, in the on-sale bar context, that the totality of the circumstances test
is often criticized as being unnecessarily vague).
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In 1998, the Supreme Court, in Pfaff v. Wells Electronics., Inc.,
eliminated the totality of the circumstances test for the on-sale bar
under 102(b).11 In Pfaff, the Court formulated a two-part test for de-
termining under what circumstances the on-sale bar renders a patent
invalid.12 The Court, however, remained silent as to whether the to-
tality of the circumstances test still applied to the public use bar. In
fact, courts continue to use the totality of the circumstances test for
determining the applicability of the public use bar. 3
Given the elimination of the totality of the circumstances test for
on-sale bar cases, it is appropriate that the Federal Circuit now re-
think the test as it applies to the public use bar. Keeping in mind the
policy considerations underlying the public use bar, the Federal Cir-
cuit needs to develop a clear and unambiguous rule for determining
what types of activities lead to an invalidating public use. A more
definite rule is needed so that inventors will not lose the right to a
patent simply because the law is unclear as to when and under what
circumstances the one-year statutory grace period for a 102(b) public
use bar is triggered.
Part I of this Article summarizes the history and development of
the public use and on-sale bars of 102(b). Part II discusses the un-
derlying policy considerations of 102(b). Part III considers the total-
ity of the circumstances test as it applies to the public use and on-sale
bars. Part III also discusses the elimination of the totality of the cir-
cumstances test for the on-sale bar. Part IV proposes a new two-part
test for determining what activities constitute an invalidating public
use, keeping in mind the underlying policy considerations of 102(b).
Finally, Part V applies the proposed public use test to cases previ-
ously decided by the Federal Circuit under the totality of the circum-
stances test.
11. 525 U.S. 55, 67-68 (1998).
12. Id.
13. See D & K Int'l, Inc. v. Gen. Binding Corp., 104 F. Supp. 2d 958, 960 (N.D. I11. 2000)
(stating that a public use analysis requires the court to look at the totality of the circumstances);
Sys. Mgmt. Arts Inc. v. Avesta Techs., Inc., 87 F. Supp. 2d 258, 264 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (considering
the totality of the circumstances in determining whether an invalidating public use occurred);
Articulate Sys., Inc. v. Apple Computer, Inc., 53 F. Supp. 2d 62, 67, 76 (D. Mass. 1999) (applying
the two-part test developed in Pfaff to the on-sale bar analysis and applying the totality of the
circumstances test to the public use bar analysis).
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I. THE HISTORY OF THE 102(b) BARS TO PATENTABILITY
Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution gives Con-
gress the power to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts"
by giving inventors an exclusive right to their discoveries for a limited
time. 14 With the power granted by the Constitution, Congress en-
acted various statutes that (1) provide inventors with an incentive to
invent and (2) promote a scheme such that the public benefits from
new and useful inventions. Since the Patent Act of 1793, Congress
recognized the importance of including a bar to patentability for the
public use or sale of an invention prior to filing a patent application.
Under the 1793 Patent Act, any public use or knowledge of an
invention prior to filing a patent application rendered void any sub-
sequent patent.15 In Pennock v. Dialogue, the Supreme Court pre-
cluded an inventor from obtaining a patent because the inventor
permitted the public use and knowledge of the invention prior to ap-
plying for a patent.16 The Court held that the inventor abandoned the
right to a patent by voluntarily allowing the invention to go into pub-
lic use or be publicly sold. 17 This early version of the Patent Act did
not include a statutory grace period. Therefore, it did not allow in-
ventors time to determine whether a particular invention was worth
patenting.
However, in 1836, Congress passed a revised version of the Pat-
ent Act, which provided that an inventor be barred from obtaining a
patent if any public use or sale occurred, with the inventor's consent,
any time prior to filing an application for a patent.18 Although this
version of the Patent Act also did not provide an inventor with a
statutory grace period, it did provide that for an inventor to be barred
by either a public use or a sale of the invention, the inventor had to
consent to the patent invalidating activities. Without the consent of
the inventor, a public use or sale of an invention did not bar an inven-
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("The Congress shall have Power to promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.").
15. 2 DONALD CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 6.02 (2000).
16. 27 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1829).
17. Id.
18. 2 CHISUM, supra note 15, § 6.02; see also Patrick J. Barrett, New Guidelines for
Applying the On Sale Bar to Patentability, 24 STAN. L. REv. 730, 731-32 (1972) (discussing the
creation of the on-sale bar).
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tor from obtaining a patent. 9 This changed in 1839, with a further
revision to the Patent Act.
The Patent Act of 1839 allowed an invention to be in public use
or on sale for no more than two years prior to the application date.20
In applying this version of the Patent Act, the Supreme Court stated
that the public use of an invention for more than two years prior to
the application for patent would bar an inventor from obtaining a
patent, regardless of whether the inventor consented to or allowed
such use.21 Congress had finally provided inventors with a period of
time after a public use or sale to file a patent application. However, a
risk still existed in not filing sooner than later because the Supreme
Court allowed the bars to take effect with any public use or sale, even
without the inventor's consent to such activities.
In 1939, the statutory grace period changed from two years to
one year.22 Congress articulated that the two-year period, while ap-
propriate in 1839, actually hindered the progress of industry by 1939.23
The one-year period did not change with the enactment of the Patent
Act of 1952. Congress codified the public use and on-sale bars in
section 102(b) of the Patent Act of 1952, which remains essentially
unchanged. 24 Section 102(b) currently provides a one-year statutory
grace period for both the public use and on-sale bars to patentabil-
ity?. 5
19. 2 CHISUM, supra note 15, § 6.02.
20. Id.
21. Egbert v. Lippman, 104 U.S. 333, 334-35 (1881). The Court made three specific points
with respect to public use under the 1839 Act. First, "one well-defined case of [public] use is
just as effectual to annul the patent as many." Id. at 336. Second, "whether the use of an
invention is public or private does not necessarily depend upon the number of persons to whom
its use is known." Id. Finally, "some inventions are by their very character only capable of
being used where they cannot be seen or observed by the public eye," and use of such
inventions will be deemed public. Id. This case demonstrates that while Congress granted some
leniency to inventors in allowing a two-year grace period, the strict definition of public use
applied by the Supreme Court still precluded many inventors from obtaining patents on their
inventions.
22. 2 CHISUM, supra note 15; see also Barrett, supra note 18 at 732.
23. 2 CHISUM, supra note 15; see also Barrett, supra note 18 at 732 (quoting the House and
Senate Reports which state that the two-year period is too long, thereby hindering industry
progress).
24. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
25. See id.
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II. THE UNDERLYING POLICY CONSIDERATIONS OF THE 102(b)
BARS
In spite of the various revisions to the Patent Act and the inclu-
sion of 102(b) to codify the public use and on-sale bars, Congress con-
tinually fails to provide any guidance in this area, leaving the courts to
determine the meaning of both "public use" and "on-sale" under
102(b).26 For more than a century prior to the formation of the Fed-
eral Circuit in 1982, courts relied on various policy considerations to
determine whether an invalidating public use or sale had taken
place.27 Since the inception of the Federal Circuit, the standard for
determining the patentability of an invention under 102(b) is to con-
sider certain underlying policy considerations in light of all the cir-
cumstances surrounding the alleged public use or sale.28 The Federal
Circuit set forth four underlying policies, which are considered in de-
termining whether an activity constitutes an invalidating public use or
sale within the meaning of 102(b). These policies include: (1) dis-
couraging the removal of inventions, that the public believes are
freely available, from the public domain; (2) encouraging prompt and
widespread disclosure of inventions; (3) prohibiting an inventor from
commercially exploiting an invention for a period exceeding that
which is statutorily prescribed; and (4) allowing an inventor reason-
able time to determine whether the invention is economically worth-
while .
29
There are differences in the analysis of the two bars. The public
use bar focuses on the public's reliance on an invention that is
thought to be in the public domain.30 In contrast, the primary concern
for an on-sale bar analysis centers on any commercial exploitation of
26. Timothy R. Holbrook, The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same:
Implications of Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc. and the Quest for Predictability in the On-Sale
Bar, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 933, 941 (2000) (arguing that the meaning of 102(b) is ambiguous
and that Congress has failed to provide any guidance).
27. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
28. The test applied by the Federal Circuit to determine whether the public use or on-sale
bar applies is known as the "totality of the circumstances" test. See supra note 7.
29. Baxter Int'l, Inc. v. Cobe Lab., Inc., 88 F.3d 1054, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Tone Bros. Inc.
v. Sysco Corp., 28 F.3d 1192, 1198 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc.,
917 F.2d 544, 550 (Fed. Cir. 1990); TP Labs., Inc., v. Prof'l Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965, 968
(Fed. Cir. 1994).
30. Cont'l Plastic Containers v. Owens Brockway Plastic Prods., 141 F.3d 1073, 1079 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) (pointing out that while the two bars are based on the same statute and the same four
policies are considered, the key policy the court looks to for the public use bar differs from the
key policy the court looks to for the on-sale bar).
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the invention beyond the statutory grace period of one year.31
However, the same four policy considerations are taken into account
in determining either a public use bar or an on-sale bar.32 These pol-
icy considerations are important for a public use or on-sale bar in-
quiry because it is said that the "policies underlying the bar[s], in
effect, define [them]." '33
The first policy consideration underlying the 102(b) bars is to
discourage inventors from removing from the public domain inven-
tions that are reasonably thought to be publicly available.3 4 This pol-
icy is also referred to as "the policy to avoid detrimental public
reliance."35 Avoiding detrimental public reliance "shapes the public
use bar. 3 6 The policy is based on the logic that once an invention
appears to be given to the public, it cannot later be taken away.37 Any
time the invention is out of the control of the inventor, the policy
against detrimental public reliance is violated because there exists the
potential that the public will gain knowledge of the invention.38 If an
inventor allows, in any way, an invention to be seen in public for a pe-
riod of time prior to patenting the invention, it is probable that the
public will eventually come to the conclusion that the invention is
freely available. Some may come to rely on that conclusion to their
detriment by producing competing products, thereby expending
money, time, and resources, only to later find out that the competing
product infringes the now-patented original invention.39 The statu-
tory grace period helps to avoid this detrimental public reliance by
31. Id.
32. Poplawski & Tripodi, supra note 9, at 2376.
33. W. Marine Elecs. Inc. v. Furuno Elec. Co., 764 F.2d 840, 844 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (stating
such in the context of the on-sale bar); TP Labs., 724 F.2d at 973 (stating such in the context of
the public use bar).
34. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
35. William C. Rooklidge, The On Sale and Public Use Bars to Patentability: The Policies
Reexamined, 1 FED. CIR. B.J. 7, 17 (1991) (discussing in detail the four underlying policy
considerations normally considered by the Federal Circuit and setting forth other policies the
court may want to consider in the future).
36. Id.
37. Id. If the possibility of public reliance exists the policy is violated. Id. at 18. "It is the
mere possibility of detrimental public reliance that must be avoided." Id.
38. Id. at 18-19.
39. See Barrett, supra note 18, at 733 (discussing that when the public begins to make, use,
and sell competing products it can be to their detriment because a patent may later be granted);
see also Vincent J. Allen, The On Sale Bar: When Will Inventors Receive Some Guidance?, 51
BAYLOR L. REV. 125, 129-30 (1999) (discussing the situation in which an inventor expends time
and money to develop a competing product and then must stop selling it when a patent is later
issued).
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providing the inventor with only a one-year period in which to place
an invention into the public domain before filing a patent application.
The second consideration courts take into account is favoring
prompt and widespread disclosure of inventions. 4° One of the goals of
the patent system is to benefit the public with new and useful in-
ventions. The patent laws are concerned with fostering progress and
innovation, which can be achieved by requiring prompt and wide-
spread public disclosure of new and useful inventions. 41 "[T]he Su-
preme Court explained that the constitutional object 'to promote the
progress of science and the useful arts' could best be accomplished
'by giving the public at large a right to make, construct, use, and vend
the thing invented, at as early a period as possible'.. ..42 Section
102(b) promotes prompt disclosure by limiting the time an inventor
has to file a patent application following certain activities.43  The
sooner a patent application is filed, the sooner the public has access to
that information. Many inventions that are patented today are not
based on entirely new concepts, but rather are improvements on al-
ready existing devices. Prompt disclosure gives other inventors access
to innovative ideas at an earlier date, which provides such inventors
with the information needed to develop improvements and new inno-
vations that may not otherwise have come into existence. 44
The third policy consideration underlying 102(b) is that an inven-
tor is not allowed to commercially exploit an invention for a period of
time greater than that which is statutorily prescribed. 45 The patent
system is framed so that the public benefits from the invention while
the inventor obtains an exclusive monopoly for a limited period of
time. Allowing an inventor to commercially exploit an invention for
an indefinite period of time before filing a patent application permits
the inventor to receive a greater benefit than that which is intended
under the patent laws.4 6 If the 102(b) bars did not exist, inventors
40. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
41. Rooklidge, supra note 35, at 39 (noting that the prompt and widespread disclosure of
new inventions gives the public knowledge that can be used to promote innovation); see also
Barrett, supra note 18, at 733 (stating that prompt disclosure adds to the "pool of public
knowledge").
42. Rooklidge, supra note 35, at 39 (quoting Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1, 19 (1829)).
43. See Barrett, supra note 18, at 733 (noting that the 102(b) bars prevent "unwarranted
delay[s]" in filing a patent application).
44. See Allen, supra note 39, at 130.
45. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
46. See Barrett, supra note 18, at 734 (noting that allowing an inventor to exploit an
invention for an indefinite period of time, in essence, extends the period of exclusive rights).
Currently, an inventor is given a twenty-year exclusive monopoly to make, use, sell, and vend a
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would be able to extend their exclusive monopolies by commercially
exploiting the invention for a period of time and only file an applica-
tion to patent the invention when a competing product becomes
available .4  Because 102(b) precludes an inventor from commercially
exploiting an invention for more than one year before filing a patent
application, the idea that an inventor is allowed an exclusive monop-
oly for a limited period of time is preserved.
The fourth and final policy consideration taken into account by
the courts is the idea that 102(b) provides an inventor with a reason-
able amount of time to determine if an invention is worth patenting.48
The process of obtaining a patent on an invention can be long and
expensive: 9 An inventor will want to make some sort of determina-
tion of whether an invention is worth the time, money, resources, and
effort the inventor is likely to incur, prior to actually applying for a
patent. 0 This may require some form of testing or selling of the in-
vention in public. Section 102(b) gives inventors one year to make a
determination as to whether the invention is worth the time and ex-
pense of obtaining a patent." Failing to provide at least some amount
of time for inventors to determine the potential of the invention may
cause reluctance on the part of some inventors to go through the
process of obtaining a patent. Without a reasonable amount of time,
some inventors may instead choose to keep the invention as a trade
secret, in which case the public will not benefit from the knowledge
disclosed by the invention.
An inquiry into the possibility of experimental use is also rele-
vant when considering whether an activity will bar an inventor from
subsequently obtaining a patent. Experimental use is not necessarily
patented invention. The grant of a patent "shall be for a term beginning on the date on which
the patent issues and ending 20 years from the date on which the application for the patent was
filed in the United States .. " 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (1994).
47. Barrett, supra note 18, at 734. Allowing inventors to sit on their rights may encourage
inventors to only apply for a patent in order to stop an alleged infringer from entering the
market. Section 102(b), however, forces an inventor to either file an application within one year
of potentially invalidating activities or risk losing the potential patent rights. Id.
48. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
49. See Vance Franklin Brown, The Incompatibility of Copyright and Computer Software:
An Economic Evaluation and a Proposal for a Marketplace Solution, 66 N.C. L. REV. 977, 981
(1988) (stating that obtaining a patent is an expensive process that can often take up to five
years); see also Raymond E. Vickery, Jr., The Laws and Outer Space: Intellectual Property, 4 J.L.
& TECH. 9, 10 (1989) (noting that obtaining a patent can take a number of years and cost
thousands of dollars).
50. See Barrett, note 18, at 735 (stating that an inventor will want to be confident the
invention is worth patenting because of the cost of obtaining a patent).
51. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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an exception to the public use and on-sale bars, but is instead consid-
ered along with all the other policies. 2 Courts need only ask a single
question: "was there a public use within the meaning of section
102(b). ''53 The Federal Circuit refers to experimental use as a nega-
tion of the 102(b) public use and on-sale bars to patentability. 4 An
invention is not in public use, and therefore not barred from pat-
entability, if the use of the invention is by reason of experiment. 5
The Supreme Court defines experimental use as: "The use of an in-
vention by the inventor himself, or any other person under his direc-
tion, by way of experiment, and in order to bring the invention to
perfection.
'56
If experimental use is an issue, the court looks to see whether the
activities of the inventor, or others, undermine the four underlying
policies of the 102(b) bars. 7 Such a decision may include considera-
tion of the following factors: how long the test period ran; the need
for testing the invention in public; whether the inventor required se-
crecy by the user; whether the inventor required records of the ex-
periments to be kept; and how much control the inventor retained
over the experiments.58 The experimental use negation allows an in-
ventor time to properly test and perfect an invention before filing an
application for a patent. The experimental use negation benefits not
only the inventor, because experimental use does not lead to a loss of
the inventor's rights to a patent, but also the public, because the in-
52. Tone Bros. Inc. v. Sysco Corp., 28 F.3d 1192, 1198 (Fed. Cir. 1994). The question of
experimental use is not a separate inquiry. "Evidence of experimentation is part of the totality
of the circumstances considered in a public use inquiry." Id.
53. Id. As opposed to asking, "was there a public use," and if so, "was it experimental."
Id.
54. TP Labs., Inc., v. Prof'l Positioners, Inc., 724 F.2d 965, 971 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("[I]n
Elizabeth, the Supreme Court did not refer to 'experimental use' as an 'exception' to the bar
otherwise created by a public use. More precisely, the Court reasoned that, if a use is
experimental, even though not secret, 'public use' is negated.").
55. Elizabeth v. Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 134 (1877) (noting that a use that is considered
experimental has never been regarded as an invalidating public use).
56. Id.
57. Tone Bros., 28 F.3d at 1198 (indicating that experimentation is considered alongside all
the other circumstances of the use).
58. See Poplawski & Tripodi, supra note 9, at 2389 (listing the various factors that may be
considered in determining if a use is an experimental use). Other factors may include: whether
the inventor received any payment for the use of the invention; who, besides the inventor,
conducted experiments; the length of the test period in relation to test periods for similar
inventions; whether the inventor engaged in promotional activities; the amount of commercial
exploitation in relation to the objective for experimentation; and the usual practice with respect
to experimentation in a particular industry. Id.
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vention undergoes testing that likely will perfect the invention prior
to use by the public.
The four underlying policy considerations of 102(b), along with
the question of experimental use, existed long before the inception of
the Federal Circuit.5 9 While the Federal Circuit adopted these policy
considerations in making a public use or on-sale determination, the
court also set forth a test that requires the four policies to be consid-
ered along with all the circumstances surrounding the alleged use or
sale. The test applied by the Federal Circuit for determining a public
use or on-sale bar is referred to as the "totality of the circumstances"
test.
III. THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES TEST AS APPLIED TO
THE 102(b) BARS
To determine whether an invalidating public use or sale oc-
curred, the court looks to the totality of the circumstances in light of
the four underlying policy considerations. 6° Some of the factors taken
into account by the court in applying the totality of the circumstances
test include: the necessity of the testing;61 how long the test period
lasted;62 the nature of the public activity;63 the availability of the in-
vention to the public;61 whether the inventor imposed a confidentiality
obligation on those who witnessed the use;65 whether the inventor
documented the experimentation; 66 whether anyone other than the
59. See Metallizing Eng'g Co., Inc. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., Inc., 153 F.2d 516,
519-20 (2d Cir. 1946) (discussing the detrimental public reliance policy and the policy
prohibiting commercial exploitation); see also Elizabeth, 97 U.S. at 137 (discussing the
experimental use negation).
60. Tone Bros., 28 F.3d at 1198; Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544,
549 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
61. Seal-Flex, Inc. v. Athletic Track & Court Constr., 98 F.3d 1318, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(considering "whether the tests or evaluations that were conducted were reasonably needed to
demonstrate the efficacy of the invention").
62. Hycor Corp. v. Schlueter Co., 740 F.2d 1529, 1535 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (considering "the
length of the test period").
63. Allied Colloids, 64 F.3d 1570, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (considering "the nature of the
activity that occurred in public").
64. Id. (considering "the public access to and knowledge of the public use").
65. Id. (considering "whether there was any confidentiality obligation imposed on persons
who observed the use"); U.S. Envtl. Prods., Inc. v. Westall, 911 F.2d 713, 717 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(considering "lack of secrecy obligations on the part of the user"); Hycor Corp., 740 F.2d at 1535
(considering "whether there is a secrecy obligation on the part of the user").
66. Seal-Flex, 98 F.3d at 1323 (considering "whether records were kept"); Allied Colloids,
64 F.3d at 1574 ("whether progress records or other indicia of experimental activity were kept");
U.S. Envtl. Prods., 911 F.2d at 717 (considering "lack of record keeping"); Hycor Corp., 740
F.2d at 1535 (considering "whether progress records were kept").
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inventor, or someone under the inventor's guidance, conducted ex-
periments;67 the amount of experimentation performed;6 the magni-
tude of the experimentation compared with commercial conditions;
69
the length of the test period compared with test periods for similar
products; 0 whether the inventor received payments for the tested
product;' and the regularity of the testing.
72
However, some criticize the totality of the circumstances test as
vague and indefinite. 3 "The patent system represents a carefully
crafted bargain that encourages both the creation and the public dis-
closure of new and useful advances in technology, in return for an ex-
clusive monopoly for a limited period of time. '74 The patent system,
therefore, benefits both the public as well as inventors. However, be-
cause the totality of the circumstances test is vague it does not give
inventors a bright-line rule as to what types of activities constitute a
public use or sale under 102(b). The failure to provide a bright-line
rule may unnecessarily bar many inventors from obtaining patents, or
invalidate existing patents. Lack of a bright-line rule hinders the quid
67. Seal-Flex, 98 F.3d at 1323 (considering "whether the evaluation was done by or on
behalf of the inventor"); Allied Colloids, 64 F.3d at 1574 (considering "whether persons other
than the inventor or acting for the inventor conducted the experiments"); U.S. Envtl. Prods., 911
F.2d at 717 (considering "lack of control by the inventor"); Hycor Corp., 740 F.2d at 1535
(considering "whether persons other than the inventor conducted the asserted experiments").
68. Allied Colloids, 64 F.3d at 1574 (considering "how many tests were conducted"); Hycor
Corp., 740 F.2d at 1535 (considering "how many tests were conducted").
69. Allied Colloids, 64 F.3d at 1574 (considering "the scale of the tests compared with
commercial conditions").
70. Seal-Flex, 98 F.3d at 1323 (considering "the length of the evaluation period in relation
to the nature of the invention"); Allied Colloids, 64 F.3d at 1574 (considering "the length of the
test period in comparison with tests of similar products"); Hycor Corp., 740 F.2d at 1535
(considering "how long the testing period was in relationship to tests of other similar devices").
71. Seal-Flex, 98 F.3d at 1323 (considering "whether payment was received"); Allied
Colloids, 64 F.3d at 1574 (considering "whether payment was made for the product of the
tests"); Hycor Corp., 740 F.2d at 1535 (considering "whether any payment was made for the
device").
72. Seal-Flex, 98 F.3d at 1323 (considering "whether testing was systematically
performed").
73. Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 103 F.3d 1517, 1519 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (Lourie, J., concurring)
("With respect to... public use.... courts have been accustomed to referring to their
determinations as involving 'the totality of the circumstances,' a phrase that some have objected
to as being indefinite."); Seal-Flex, 98 F.3d at 1323 n.2 (stating, in the on-sale bar context, that
even though the totality of the circumstances remains as the test applied by the Federal Circuit,
the standard is criticized for being unnecessarily vague).
74. 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998); see also Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S.
141, 150-51 (1989) ("The federal patent system thus embodies a carefully crafted bargain for
encouraging the creation and disclosure of new, useful, and nonobvious advances in technology
and design in return for the exclusive right to practice the invention for a period of years."); see
also Katherine E. White, A General Rule of Law is Needed to Define Public Use in Patent Cases,
88 KY. L.J. 423, 453-54 (2000) (citing Pfaff, 525 U.S. 55).
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pro quo of the patent system because inventors needlessly lose the
right to patent new and useful inventions. This loss of right may
prompt some inventors to keep inventions out of the public domain
altogether because the benefit to the inventor of disclosing the inven-
tion to the public decreases without a patent that affords the inventor
an exclusive monopoly on the invention for a limited period of time.
Despite the criticism, the Federal Circuit continues to use this test for
determining whether the public use bar prevents an inventor from ob-
taining a patent,75 even though the Supreme Court recently elimi-
nated the totality of the circumstances test as applied to the on-sale
bar.
76
In 1998, the Supreme Court created a new two-part test for de-
termining when the on-sale bar is triggered.77 In formulating the new
test for the on-sale bar, the Court began by reviewing the purpose of
the patent regime. 78 The Supreme Court noted that the patent system
attempts to strike a balance between benefiting the public by dis-
75. See, e.g., Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 86 F.3d 1113 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Moleculon Research
Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261 (Fed. Cir. 1986); see also D & K Int'l, Inc. v. Gen. Binding
Corp., 104 F. Supp. 2d 958, 960 (N.D. I11. 2000) (stating that a public use analysis requires the
court to look at the totality of the circumstances); Sys. Mgmt. Arts Inc. v. Avesta Techs., Inc., 87
F. Supp. 2d 258, 264 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (considering the totality of the circumstances in
determining whether an invalidating public use occurred); Articulate Sys., Inc. v. Apple
Computer, Inc., 53 F. Supp. 2d 62, 67, 76 (D. Mass. 1999) (applying the two-part test developed
in Pfaff to the on-sale bar analysis and applying the totality of the circumstances test to the
public use bar analysis).
76. Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 67 (setting forth a two-part test for determining whether an on-sale
bar occurred); see also Weatherchem Corp. v. J.L. Clark, Inc., 163 F.3d 1326, 1332 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (applying the two-part on-sale bar test set forth in Pfaff).
77. Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 67. On April 19, 1982, Pfaff applied for a patent on a computer chip
socket. Id. at 57. Soon after the patent issued, Pfaff brought an infringement action against
Wells Electronics for manufacturing a competing device. Id. at 59. Wells Electronics argued
that Pfaff's patent claims were invalid because on April 8, 1981, Pfaff agreed to sell the device to
Texas Instruments, but did not file the patent application until April 19, 1982, thus putting the
device "on sale" prior to the critical date of April 8, 1982. Id. at 58-59. The District Court held
that 102(b) did not invalidate the patent because reduction to practice did not occur more than
one year prior to the time that Pfaff filed the patent application. Id. at 59. The Federal Circuit
reversed, finding the invention on sale within the meaning of 102(b). Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc.,
124 F.3d 1429, 1435 (Fed. Cir. 1997). In deciding whether to invalidate the patent under 102(b),
the court considered the totality of the circumstances weighed against the underlying policy
considerations of the on-sale bar. Id. at 1433. The Federal Circuit concluded that reduction to
practice is not necessary to trigger the 102(b) statutory grace period. Id. at 1433-34. The court
stated that the one-year period begins to run at the time of the sale if the invention is
"substantially complete," even though there may not be a physical embodiment of the
invention. Id. at 1434-35. The Supreme Court granted certiorari because other courts had held
that an invention must first be reduced to practice to be on sale within the meaning of 102(b),
and because 102(b) does not include the "substantially complete" criterion used by the Federal
Circuit. Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 60.
78. Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 63 (reinforcing that the quid pro quo of the patent system awards
inventors with a limited monopoly in exchange for public disclosure of information).
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closing new and useful inventions and providing the inventor with an
incentive to create by allowing the inventor to obtain an exclusive
monopoly for a limited period of time.79 The Court acknowledged
that one reason for the one-year grace period set forth in 102(b) is to
provide the inventor with some certainty about when an application
for a patent must be filed.80
The first part of the Federal Circuit's test requires that the inven-
tion be the subject of a commercial sale or offer for sale.sl The Court
stated that this requirement is clear to the inventor, who has control
over a sale or an offer for sale. 82 The second part of the Court's test
requires that the invention be "ready-for-patenting. '83 An invention
is ready for patenting if, prior to the critical date, there is either (1) a
reduction to practice of the invention;84 or (2) there exists sufficiently
specific drawings and descriptions that allow one skilled in the art to
practice the invention.8
5
The two-part ready-for-patenting test affords more guidance to
inventors than the totality of the circumstances analysis is capable of
providing.86 Not only does the totality of the circumstances test take
into consideration all the factors of the new test, but it also takes into
account any number of factors the court finds helpful for each case.
Such a case-by-case analysis under the totality of the circumstances
standard makes it nearly, if not completely, impossible to formulate
any hard and fast rules around which inventors and hopeful patentees
79. Id.
80. Id. at 65 (recognizing that there is a need to provide inventors with clearer standards
for determining when a patent application must be filed).
81. Id. at 67 (stating that "[f]irst, the product must be the subject of a commercial offer for
sale").
82. Id. (noting that the inventor understands and has the ability to control any marketing of
an invention).
83. Id.
84. Reduction to practice occurs when an invention is capable of working for its intended
purpose. Gen. Elec. Co. v. United States, 654 F.2d 55, 60 (Ct. Cl. 1981).
85. Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 67-68. In Pfaff, the inventor sent drawings, which sufficiently
disclosed the invention, to the manufacturer prior to the critical date. Id. at 68.
86. The first prong of the test is straightforward and should not present a problem to
inventors, who are arguably in the best position to know when their inventions are the subject of
an offer for sale. The second prong of the Pfaff test is what will seemingly present the most
confusion. What exactly constitutes "drawings or descriptions sufficiently specific" to allow one
skilled in the art to practice the invention? A concept described in sufficient detail on paper
carries with it the possibility, even if slight, of not working once reduced to practice. There
exists a possibility, with the ready-for-patenting requirement, that an inventor will be forced to
file a patent application before there is any certainty that the invention will work as patented.
So, while the Supreme Court took definite steps towards eliminating some of the ambiguity in
determining whether the on-sale bar applies, the ready-for-patenting prong of the Court's test
continues to leave inventors with at least some amount of uncertainty.
[Vol. 77:1359
2002] ELIMINATING THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES TEST 1373
can pattern their activities to avoid a 102(b) public use or on-sale bar.
The Supreme Court has taken steps to clear up some of the uncer-
tainty surrounding the on-sale bar of 102(b) by eliminating the total-
ity of the circumstances test. However, the Supreme Court, in
formulating the two-part test for the on-sale bar, remained silent re-
garding the public use bar under 102(b).
IV. ELIMINATING THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES TEST
FOR THE 102(b) PUBLIC USE BAR: A NEW TEST PROPOSED
Since Pfaff, courts continue to apply the totality of the circum-
stances test for determining whether a patent is invalid under the
102(b) public use bar.87 The same uncertainty that applied to the on-
sale bar under the totality of the circumstances test also applies to the
public use bar.88 Because the Supreme Court took steps towards sup-
plying the patent system with more certainty for determining a 102(b)
on-sale bar, by eliminating the totality of the circumstances test, the
Federal Circuit should do the same for the public use bar, thereby, at
the very least, reducing some of the uncertainty that plagues the pub-
lic use bar.
It should be noted that the totality of the circumstances test that
formerly applied to an on-sale bar analysis is slightly different from
the totality of the circumstances test still used for public use cases.89
While the questions a court asks under the totality of the circum-
stances test for both of the 102(b) bars are primarily the same,90 the
focus is different for the public use bar as compared with the on-sale
bar. The totality of the circumstances test previously used for an on-
sale bar determination addressed "the stage of product develop-
87. D & K Int'l, Inc. v. Gen. Binding Corp., 104 F. Supp. 2d 958, 960 (N.D. I11. 2000)
(stating that a public use analysis requires the court to look at the totality of the circumstances);
Sys. Mgmt. Arts Inc. v. Avesta Techs., Inc., 87 F. Supp. 2d 258, 264 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(considering the totality of the circumstance in determining whether an invalidating public use
occurred); Articulate Sys., Inc. v. Apple Computer, Inc., 53 F. Supp. 2d 62, 67, 76 (D. Mass.
1999) (applying the two-part test developed in Pfaff to the on-sale bar analysis and applying the
totality of the circumstances test to the public use bar analysis).
88. Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 103 F.3d 1517, 1519 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (Lourie, J., concurring)
("With respect to ... public use..., courts have been accustomed to referring to their
determinations as involving 'the totality of the circumstances,' a phrase that some have objected
to as being indefinite."); Seal-Flex, Inc. v. Athletic Track & Court Constr., 98 F.3d 1318, 1323
n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (stating, in the on-sale bar context, that the totality of the circumstances test
is often criticized as being unnecessarily vague).
89. Articulate Sys., 53 F. Supp. 2d at 67 n.1.
90. Poplawski & Tripodi, supra note 9, at 2383 (noting many of the same factors apply in
assessing both the public use bar and the on-sale bar).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
ment." 91  The totality of the circumstances test applied when
determining a public use bar is concerned with "the type and degree
of use and display that suffices to constitute a public use for purposes
of... 102(b). ' '92 This distinction plays a role in formulating the new
test for determining when and if a public use has occurred. The pro-
posed test seeks to provide inventors with some guidance as to the
types of actions that can be taken outside of the statutory time period
without losing the potential patent rights to an invention.
Keeping the underlying policy considerations in mind, the pro-
posal sets forth a two-part test for determining if a public use bar is
applicable. Under the proposed test, the one-year statutory grace pe-
riod begins when: (1) there is any nonexperimental use by or visible
to someone other than the inventor or those under the inventor's di-
rection 93; and (2) the invention is reduced to practice. Under the
proposed test, any use outside of the inventor's control triggers the
statutory bar, provided the invention is reduced to practice. In addi-
tion, any use by the inventor or others under the inventor's control
will constitute a public use if in the presence of, or visible to, a third
party.
Although a single use by or in the presence of even a close friend
or family member of the inventor may meet the first part of the test, it
is not excessively strict towards inventors. The Supreme Court has
held that it is not necessary to have in use more than one of the pat-
ented devices to constitute a public use.94 In addition, even if the use
is confined to one person the use may still be considered public.95
Logically, if the inventor is able to distribute an invention, to even a
91. Articulate Sys., 53 F. Supp. 2d at 67 n.1.
92. Id.
93. "Under the inventor's direction" includes persons aiding the inventor in developing or
testing, such as a research assistant. However, a family member, with no real connection to the
invention other than the knowledge that the invention exists or how the invention works, would
not be considered as being under the inventor's direction. In other words, those that have no
real connection to the invention are considered to be part of the general "public." Therefore,
use of the invention by or made visible to those with no connection to the invention is a public
use, at least for purposes of the first part of the test.
94. Egbert v. Lippman, 104 U.S. 333, 334-35 (1881). In Egbert, the inventor developed and
patented an improvement to corset springs. Id. at 335. He gave the corset springs to a close
friend, whom he later married. Id. The Supreme Court held that a public use does not require
"more than one of the patented articles" to be used. Id. at 336.
95. Id. at 336. The nature of invention in Egbert, corset springs, is not visible to the general
public. Id. It is possible for such an invention to only be known by the person using it.
However, in Egbert, the Court found that the inventor did not, in any way, restrict his wife's use
of the corset springs; he did not require her to keep the invention private. Id. at 337. Therefore,
the Court determined that the use constituted an invalidating public use. Id.
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limited number of people for their use, without needing to perform
experimentation on the invention, there is no reason why the inventor
should be allowed to sit on the patent rights for more than one year.
If there is experimentation then it can be said that the inventor is
trying to determine if the invention works properly and if the inven-
tion is worth patenting. However, as soon as the experimentation pe-
riod ends, the inventor has no excuse for waiting to apply for a patent.
Furthermore, pairing this condition with the second prong of the pro-
posed test gives an inventor ample time to develop and perfect an in-
vention worth patenting.
The second part of the proposed test is narrower than the second
part of the on-sale bar test as set forth in Pfaff. In Pfaff, the Supreme
Court stated that to satisfy an on-sale bar, an invention must be ready
for patenting.9 6 The on-sale bar test does not require the invention to
be reduced to practice, although reduction to practice will satisfy that
part of the inquiry.97 While the ready-for-patenting requirement may
be sufficient for making an on-sale bar determination, for an inven-
tion to be in public use it almost certainly must be reduced to prac-
tice.
For the public to "use" an invention, especially one that is com-
plex, a physical embodiment of that invention must exist. The public
use of the invention depends on whether the invention is capable of
use at the time it enters the public domain. An inventor should not
lose the right to a future patent, by way of the 102(b) public use bar,
unless the public is actually capable of using the invention, which by
definition seems to require a full and complete physical embodiment.
The general public does not benefit from the disclosure of sufficiently
detailed drawings and descriptions of the invention because drawings
and descriptions do not allow the public to use the invention for its
intended purpose.
Formulating a test that triggers, after the invention is reduced to
practice, the one-year statutory grace period for the public use bar as
soon as there is a nonexperimental use by or visible to anyone not
under the inventor's control does not undermine any of the underly-
ing policy considerations of the public use bar. First, the proposed
96. 525 U.S. 55, 67 (1998); see also supra Part III (discussing the Pfaff test and the ready-
for-patenting requirement).
97. Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 66-67 (noting that mere drawings sufficient to allow one skilled in the
art to practice the invention satisfy the ready-for-patenting requirement).
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test promotes the policy of avoiding detrimental public reliance. 98
This consideration takes into account the "mere possibility of detri-
mental public reliance." 99 Uses by or visible to persons with no tan-
gible connection to the invention, meaning persons who did not aid
the inventor in developing or testing the invention, presents the pos-
sibility of public reliance. This is because if someone cannot be char-
acterized as the inventor or an aid to the inventor, than that person is
part of the general public with respect to that particular invention.
By dictating that uses by or visible to those outside the inventor's
control trigger the public use bar, the first policy consideration is up-
held. The inventor also has the added insurance of part two of the
proposed test. A use by or visible to someone other than the inventor
or those under the inventor's control is only a public use if the inven-
tion has been reduced to practice.
However, once there is a reduction to practice any use in public
will likely lead the public to believe that the invention is publicly
available. After all, if an invention that is reduced to practice is used
in public, and the inventor has not filed a patent application, there is
no reason for another inventor to believe that such information and
knowledge is not freely available. Therefore, other inventors may
detrimentally rely on what they believe to be publicly available in
producing competing products or developing improvements on ex-
isting products. A single use by or visible to the public is capable of
causing detrimental reliance. The proposed test upholds the policy of
public reliance because it triggers the public use bar at the moment a
reduced-to-practice invention is visible to the general public.
Second, the proposed test aids in furthering the policy of favor-
ing prompt and widespread disclosure of inventions. 1°° The fact that
the bar is not triggered until the invention is reduced to practice does
not undermine prompt disclosure because the public at large will not
benefit from mere drawings and concepts, which do not allow for use
of the invention. Unless an inventor plans on keeping an invention
secret there is no legitimate reason not to disclose to the public the
knowledge of the invention. Prompt and widespread disclosure al-
lows other inventors access to new and innovative ideas at an earlier
98. See supra Part II (discussing the policy considerations underlying the pubic use bar).
99. Rooklidge, supra note 35, at 18.
100. See supra Part II. This policy consideration is probably the most important with respect
to the public use bar.
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date, which inventors then use to create improvements or new inven-
tions.101
Third, the proposed test does not undermine the policy of pre-
venting commercial exploitation of inventions for more than the
statutorily prescribed period of time.10 2 While it will still be possible
for inventors to commercially exploit a concept prior to actually re-
ducing the invention to practice, once the invention is reduced to
practice any commercial exploitation will likely qualify as a public
use.103 It is not uncommon, in order to sell an invention, to demon-
strate how the invention works. Under the proposed test, such a
demonstration qualifies as a public use because it is use of a reduced-
to-practice invention that is visible to those outside the inventor's
control. Because any nonexperimental use' of the invention by or
visible to anyone other than the inventor or those under the inven-
tor's direction is considered a public use under the proposed test, the
one-year statutory grace period is triggered as soon as the inventor
offers to sell an invention that is reduced to practice.
Fourth, the proposed test provides the inventor with a reason-
able amount of time to determine whether an invention is worth pat-
enting.1°4 The statute allows one year to determine if the invention is
worthwhile. The statutory time period is not cut short by barring an
inventor from obtaining a patent one year after any nonexperimental
public use of a reduced-to-practice invention. Inventors are still al-
lowed to perform experiments and tests to perfect the invention.
Only when there is a physical embodiment of the invention that is ca-
pable of its intended use can the one-year grace period begin. If the
invention is used in public for a nonexperimental purpose and the in-
vention is reduced to practice there is no reason for allowing inven-
tors to sit on patent rights for more than one year.
The proposed two-part test does not undermine any of the four
underlying policy considerations of the public use bar. Yet, the test
provides inventors with a clearer picture of when and how a public
use bar is triggered than does the current totality of the circumstances
test. It should be clear to the inventor if a use is not for experimental
purposes because the inventor has control over testing and experi-
101. See id.
102. Id. This policy consideration is actually more important with respect to the on-sale bar.
103. In any event, a commercial exploitation of a concept would almost certainly fall under
the on-sale bar and the Pfaff test.
104. See supra Part II.
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mentation. It should also be clear to the inventor when the invention
is actually reduced to practice. The proposed test allows inventors to
conform any use of the invention so as not to lose the potential patent
rights.
V. EXAMINATION OF PRIOR CASES USING THE PROPOSED TEST
FOR THE PUBLIC USE BAR
In Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., the Federal Circuit
rejected the alleged infringer's defense of invalidity based on the
public use bar.105 However, under similar facts the Federal Circuit in
Lough v. Brunswick Corp. held the patent invalid under the 102(b)
public use bar.1°6 In both instances, the court used the totality of the
circumstances approach to determine whether an invalidating public
use occurred. 107 Intuitively, one would expect the Federal Circuit to
have reached the same outcome in both Moleculon Research Corp.
and Lough based on the factual similarities between the two cases.
Applying the proposed two-part test to the facts of Moleculon Re-
search Corp., Lough, and Baxter Int'l, demonstrates that it is possible
to achieve a more consistent outcome in cases dealing with the public
use bar, while promoting the underlying policy considerations of
102(b).
A. Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc.
1. Factual Overview
In Moleculon Research Corp., Moleculon sued CBS for in-
fringement of a patent on an invention developed by Larry Nichols,
an employee of Moleculon. 108 The Federal Circuit described the in-
vention as a "three-dimensional puzzle capable of rotational move-
ment."'1 9  Over a period of years, Nichols showed various paper
models to some close friends."0 Eventually Nichols constructed a
105. 793 F.2d 1261, 1265-66 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
106. 86 F.3d 1113,1122 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
107. Id. at 1119; 793 F.2d at 1266.
108. 793 F.2d at 1263.
109. Id. The product accused of infringement in Moleculon Research Corp. is more
commonly known as the Rubik's Cube puzzle. Id. at 1264.
110. Id. at 1263. The court characterized Nichols as a long-time "puzzle enthusiast." Id.
Nichols came up with the idea of the three-dimensional puzzle in 1957. Id. For the next five
years, Nichols, then a graduate student, constructed various models of the puzzle using paper
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wooden model, which he, at times, displayed on his desk at work."'
While displayed, Moleculon's president noticed the puzzle and Nich-
ols explained how the puzzle worked. 12 Some two years after devel-
oping a working prototype of the puzzle, and more than one year
after displaying the model on his desk Nichols filed for, and received,
a patent on the invention."
3
2. Federal Circuit's Rationale and Holding
The Federal Circuit began its opinion by focusing on the "per-
sonal relationships and other surrounding circumstances" that ac-
companied the use of the puzzle."' The court held that Nichols's
display of the invention to close friends and, the use of the invention
by Nichols's boss did not constitute public use under 102(b)."5 The
court also believed that Nichols retained complete control over the
invention prior to filing the application for a patent on the puzzle.'
1 6
The Federal Circuit commented that Nichols maintained an "expecta-
tion of privacy and of confidentiality" when permitting others to view
or use the puzzle, even though Nichols did not obtain an express
agreement of confidentiality. "7 The court did not consider the ab-
sence of an express agreement to be determinative for the public use
bar analysis." 8 The Federal Circuit concluded that the policy of
avoiding detrimental public reliance, and the policy of not allowing an
inventor to commercially exploit an invention for a longer period
than that which is statutorily prescribed, were upheld by the court's
and magnets. Id. These simplistic and somewhat flimsy models were viewed by two of Nichols'
roommates and a colleague. Id. Nichols also described, to at least one of the individuals who
saw the puzzle, exactly how the puzzle worked. Id.
111. Id. Nichols developed a wooden model of the puzzle in 1968. Id.
112. Id. The president of Moleculon actually borrowed and used the puzzle for a period of
time. Id. at 1265.
113. Id. Nichols, who assigned all of his rights in the puzzle over to Moleculon, filed a
patent application for the puzzle on March 3, 1970, id., therefore making March 3, 1969, the
critical date for a public use bar.
114. Id. at 1265.
115. Id. at 1266.
116. Id. at 1265-66. The court found that the personal relationships Nichols had with the
individuals that saw the puzzle, i.e., colleagues and close friends, allowed him to maintain
complete control over the use of the puzzle at all times. Id.
117. Id. at 1265. The court also concluded that the nature of the personal relationships lent
themselves to Nichols's expectation of privacy and confidentiality. Id. at 1265-66.
118. Id. at 1266 (noting that the court looks to the totality of the circumstances and that the
presence or absence of an express confidentiality agreement is only one factor the court
considers).
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holding that Nichols's activities did not constitute an invalidating
public use under 102(b).1
9
3. Result Under the Proposed Public Use Test
Applying the facts and circumstances of Moleculon Research
Corp. to the proposed public use test yields a different result than the
holding of the Federal Circuit. Under the proposed test, the one-year
grace period begins to run if: (1) there is any nonexperimental use by
or visible to someone other than the inventor or those under the in-
ventor's direction; and (2) the invention is reduced to practice. 120 In
Moleculon Research Corp., Nichols displayed and allowed others to
use the puzzle at various times prior to the one-year period allowed
by the statute. 21 Under the proposed test, such use would constitute
an invalidating public use. Nichols himself used the invention in the
presence of others.2 2  Each instance of using the invention in the
presence of others meets the first prong of the proposed test for a
public use bar. In Moleculon Research Corp., Nichols developed a
full working wooden model of the puzzle,'23 therefore presumably re-
quiring no further experimentation of the invention. Because Nichols
developed a complete working model of the invention, the reduction
to practice requirement, the second part of the proposed test, is met.
Under the proposed test for the public use bar, the patent in
Moleculon Research Corp. would have been held invalid because of
the activities that occurred prior to the critical date.
4. Does the Proposed Test Support the Underlying Policy
Considerations of the Public Use Bar?
Considering that Nichols displayed the puzzle on his desk at
work, it is reasonable to conclude that those who saw the puzzle be-
lieved it to be publicly available. The public, in this case Nichols's
colleagues, had the ability to gain knowledge of the puzzle by its dis-
play on Nichols's desk. Again, the "mere possibility of detrimental
119. Id. (finding that such a conclusion removed nothing from the public domain and that no
evidence of commercial activity existed).
120. See supra Part VI.
121. Moleculon Research Corp., 793 F.2d at 1263; see also supra Parts V.A.1-2.
122. Moleculon Research Corp., 793 F.2d at 1263. None of the people that Nichols used the
invention in front of helped or aided him in designing or testing the invention. Everyone that
saw Nichols use the invention was a member of the general public; they were outside of the
inventor's control or direction. See also supra Parts V.A.1-2.
123. Moleculon Research Corp., 793 F.2d at 1263; see also supra Part V.A.1.
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public reliance" is the cornerstone of the policy discouraging inven-
tors from removing inventions, thought to be freely available, from
the public domain.2 4 Nichols conceived of the puzzle more than ten
years prior to filing a patent application; made prototypes of the puz-
zle at least eight years prior to filing a patent application; and con-
structed a working model two years prior to filing a patent
application. 25 Waiting almost fifteen years from the time of the initial
conception until filing the patent application, for a fairly simple
invention, does not promote the policy of prompt and widespread
disclosure. After Nichols assigned his rights, Moleculon contacted
game manufacturers in an attempt to market the puzzle. 126 The Fed-
eral Circuit's holding in Moleculon Research Corp. undermines the
underlying policy considerations of the 102(b) public use bar. How-
ever, under the proposed public use test, the facts of this case would
have compelled the court to hold the patent invalid. Such a conclu-
sion upholds the four underlying policy considerations of 102(b).
B. Lough v. Brunswick Corp.
1. Factual Overview
In Lough v. Brunswick Corp., Lough, a boat repairman, devel-
oped an upper seal assembly for inboard/outboard Brunswick boat
motors.1 27 The existing seal assembly apparently caused corrosion, so
Lough invented an upper seal assembly to prevent such corrosion.128
Lough made and distributed six prototypes of the upper seal assem-
bly.129 Lough installed one of the prototypes on his own boat. 30
Lough gave the second prototype to a friend to install on his boat.'
Lough then installed one on the boat of the owner of the marina in
which Lough worked and on the boat of a customer of the marina.13 2
Lough gave the last two prototypes to friends working at another ma-
rina, who subsequently installed the prototypes on the boat of a local
124. Rooklidge, supra note 35, at 18.
125. Moleculon Research Corp., 793 F.2d at 1263.
126. Id. Nichols assigned his rights in March 1969 and Moleculon sent a prototype to Parker
Brothers on March 7, 1969. Id.
127. 86 F.3d 1113, 1115-16 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
128. Id. at 1116
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charter guide and on a demonstration boat later sold to an unknown
party.1 3  A year passed and Lough did not ask for or receive any in-
formation on the condition of the prototypes. 134 In addition, Lough
did not keep records of any testing or experimentation relating to the
invention. 35
2. Federal Circuit's Rationale and Holding
The Federal Circuit determined that Lough's activities consti-
tuted an invalidating public use under 102(b) . 3 6 The case presented
the issue of whether Lough's use prior to the critical date of June 6,
1987, constituted experimental use, therefore negating the public use
bar. 37 The court did not regard Lough's actions as experimental with
respect to the prototypes he distributed. 38 The Federal Circuit fo-
cused on the fact that Lough did not request any follow-up comments
on the operability of the device once he distributed five of the six pro-
totypes to third parties. 139 Lough failed to keep records, inspect the
devices, or maintain any sort of control over any of the devices once
installed on the boats of his friends and acquaintances. 14° Because the
Federal Circuit concluded that Lough's activities did not constitute
experimental use, the court found the invention to be in public use,
therefore invalidating Lough's patent.
14
133. Id. Lough did not keep track of what happened to these two prototypes after giving
them to his friends. Id.
134. Id. at 1116. Lough did not attempt to follow up on the operability of any of the upper
seal assemblies he distributed to his friends and acquaintances; he never bothered to inspect the
device to make sure it worked properly. Id. at 1121.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1122. Lough conceived of, constructed, and distributed prototypes of the seal
assembly in the spring of 1986. Id. at 1116. Lough did not file a patent application until June 6,
1988. Id. Lough sued Brunswick for patent infringement and Brunswick counterclaimed for the
patent to be held invalid because of the public use bar. Id. at 1118.
137. Id. at 1120. Both parties agreed that the seal assembly had been used prior to the
critical date, but Lough argued that such use constituted experimental use. Id.
138. Id. at 1122.
139. Id. at 1121. The court found no evidence of experimentation, such as record keeping.
Id. The court rejected Lough's own testimony that the uses were experimental. The court
stated that an inventor's own subjective intent is of little value. Id. at 1122.
140. Id. at 1121; see also supra Part III (stating that the totality of the circumstances test
includes looking at such factors as whether progress records were kept and whether anyone
other than the inventor conducted experiments).
141. Id. at 1122. The court's opinion made it clear that experimental use is afforded to
inventors, and indeed necessary in many cases, to determine if the invention works for its
intended purpose. However, the court also recognized that providing an inventor with a
reasonable amount of time to perfect an invention does not give an inventor the right to freely
distribute an invention without maintaining control over its use and later claim experimental use
in order to negate a public use bar to patentability. Id.
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3. Result Under the Proposed Public Use Test
The Federal Circuit's holding in this case does not change under
the proposed test for public use. Again, the proposed test states that
a use is public if: (1) there is any nonexperimental use by or visible to
someone other than the inventor or those under the inventor's direc-
tion; and (2) the invention is reduced to practice.142 Lough distributed
the invention to others, not under his direction, for its use on various
boat motors.143  At no time did Lough's actions amount to ex-
perimentation or testing of the device. 1" The first part of the pro-
posed test is satisfied because Lough allowed others to use the
invention. Lough never requested any feedback on the operability of
the device, therefore, the individuals he distributed the invention to
were not under the inventor's control or direction. Lough did not
perform further testing and the device apparently worked for its in-
tended purpose, meaning that Lough achieved a reduction to practice
of the invention by the time he distributed the six prototypes.
1 45
Therefore, the second part of the proposed test is satisfied. Applying
the proposed two-part test, the public use bar invalidates the patent in
Lough. The outcome under the proposed test does not differ from
that of the Federal Circuit, which applied the totality of the circum-
stances test in finding an invalidating public use.
4. Does the Proposed Test Support the Underlying Policy
Considerations of the Public Use Bar?
Taking into consideration the fact that Lough freely distributed
the invention without requiring input or comments on how the seal
assembly performed after installation, it is reasonable to conclude
that those with access to the seal assembly believed the device to be
publicly available. The policy of avoiding detrimental public reliance
cannot be upheld in such a situation without finding an invalidating
public use. Lough waited approximately two years to patent the in-
vention. 146 Furthermore, this delay came after reduction to practice of
the seal assembly.147 Such a delay does not support the policy of
142. See supra Part IV.
143. Lough, 86 F.3d at 1121; see also Parts V.B.1-2.
144. Lough, 86 F.3d at 1121; see also Part V.B.2.
145. Lough, 86 F.3d at 1121.
146. Id. at 1116. Lough began installing the prototypes in the spring of 1986, but did not
apply for a patent until June 6, 1988. Id.
147. Id. at 1122.
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allowing the public access to the information at the earliest possible
date. Lough did not ask for compensation nor did he try to sell the
invention until after he filed the patent application. 148 Therefore, the
policy relating to commercial exploitation did not play a role in de-
termining whether an invalidating public use occurred. Finally, the
policy of allowing an inventor with a reasonable amount of time to
determine if the invention is worthwhile is not undercut by a finding
that the public use bar applies. The invention worked for its intended
purpose nearly two years prior to filing a patent application. Both the
holding of the Federal Circuit and the outcome using the proposed
test support the underlying policy considerations of the 102(b) public
use bar.
C. Baxter Int'l, Inc. v. Cobe Labs., Inc.
1. Factual Overview
In Baxter International, Inc. v. Cobe Labs., Inc., Baxter accused
Cobe of infringement for a patent on a sealless centrifuge used to
separate blood.149 Dr. Suaudeau began using a sealless centrifuge de-
veloped by a colleague. 150 A patent application had not yet been filed
for the centrifuge when Suaudeau began using the device. 5' In the
meantime, another inventor, unknown to both Suaudeau and his col-
league, developed and patented an invention very similar to sealless
centrifuge being used by Suaudeau152 Suaudeau used the centrifuge
in his lab at the National Institutes of Health ("NIH") and he later
used it at a hospital he worked for after he left NIH.15 3 Use of the
centrifuge at both locations could be seen to anyone who entered ei-
148. Id. at 1119.
149. 88 F.3d 1054, 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
150. Id. Suaudeau, while working as a research scientist at the National Institutes of Health,
experienced problems with the centrifuge he used for his research to separate whole blood from
platelet-rich plasma. Id. The rotating seals in the centrifuge damaged the platelets. Id.
Suaudeau spoke with Dr. Ito about the problem and Ito recommended that Suaudeau use a
sealless centrifuge that Ito had previously developed. Id.
151. Id. Ito attempted to, at a later date, file a patent application on the centrifuge, but the
application was placed on interference with an earlier application filed by Herbert Cullis. Id.
152. Id. Cullis is the inventor named in the patent at issue. Id.
153. Id. In some of the tests performed by Suaudeau, the centrifuge would run for as long as
forty-three hours. Id. Therefore, the centrifuge would be sitting out in the lab for extended
periods of time.
[Vol. 77:1359
2002] ELIMINATING THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES TEST 1385
ther lab. 154  In addition, Suaudeau never asked those entering the
laboratories to keep the invention secret or confidential.'55
2. Federal Circuit's Rationale and Holding
The Federal Circuit held that the use of the invention prior to the
critical date constituted a public use under 102(b) and invalidated the
patent.5 6  The court considered the policy of avoiding detrimental
public reliance as the key issue in the case. 57 The Federal Circuit dis-
cussed the "free flow" of various people into the laboratories in which
Suaudeau kept the centrifuge, noting that Suaudeau worked in labo-
ratories located in public buildings.'1 8 The court concluded that be-
cause Suaudeau did not place an obligation of secrecy or
confidentiality on anyone who entered either the NIH lab or the lab
at the hospital, "those who saw the centrifuge in operation would
have reasonably believed the centrifuge was publicly available."' 9
The court rejected Baxter's argument that the use by Suaudeau prior
to the critical date constituted experimental use.' 60 The court con-
cluded that the invention had been reduced to practice and already
worked for its intended purpose at the time Suaudeau began using
the centrifuge.1 61 The court held "that public testing before the criti-
cal date by a third party ... of an invention previously reduced to
practice and obtained by someone other than the patentee, when such
testing is independent of and not controlled by the patentee, is an in-
validating pubic use.... "162
154. Id. at 1058.
155. Id. Suaudeau apparently never asked those who entered the lab and actually saw the
centrifuge in operation to keep information about the invention confidential. Id.
156. Id. at 1061.
157. Id. at 1058. "[Tlhe most applicable policy underlying the public use bar here is
discouraging removal from the public domain of inventions that the public reasonably has come
to believe are freely available." Id.
158. Id. at 1058-59.
159. Id. at 1058 (rejecting Baxter's argument that the individuals who saw the centrifuge
were ethically obligated to secrecy).
160. Baxter Int'l, 88 F.3d at 1060. The court recognized some flaws in Baxter's experimental
use argument. The court noted that experimental use requires the inventor to maintain a
certain amount of control over the testing. Id. This case presented a situation where the patent
holder, Cullis, and the user, Suaudeau, were unknown to each other during the use by
Suaudeau. Id. at 1056. It seemingly follows then that Cullis had no control over the use by
Suaudeau.
161. Id. at 1060. While Suaudeau made modifications to the invention to suit his own
purposes, the "basic features" of the invention were at no time modified. Id. Reduction to
practice had already taken place. Id.
162. Id. at 1060-61.
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3. Result Under the Proposed Public Use Test
Using the proposed two-part test for determining whether a
public use bar applies does not change the Federal Circuit's holding
in Baxter Int'l. Under the proposed test, a use is public within the
meaning of 102(b) if: (1) there is any nonexperimental use by or visi-
ble to someone other than the inventor or those under the inventor's
direction; and (2) the invention is reduced to practice. 163 In Baxter
Int'l, the invention could be seen in operation by anyone who entered
Suaudeau's laboratories, both of which were located in public facili-
ties. 164 In this case, unlike both Moleculon Research Corp. and Lough,
the invention was not necessarily used by others (with the exception
of Suaudeau), but was only visible to those who entered the
laboratories. Because the invention was visible to parties outside the
control of the inventor the first part of the proposed test is satisfied.
In addition, based on the facts of the case, Suaudeau's use could also
qualify as a public use under the proposed test. Suaudeau's colleague
actually invented the centrifuge; Suaudeau was not involved, in any
way, with the actual development of the invention. Furthermore, the
activities conducted by Suaudeau did not constitute experimental use
of the centrifuge. 16 Also, the court specifically noted that reduction
to practice occurred prior to the time Suaudeau began using the cen-
trifuge. 166 Therefore, the second part of the proposed test is met. The
Federal Circuit's finding of public use, which invalidated the patent,
does not change under the proposed test.
4. Does the Proposed Test Support the Underlying Policy
Considerations of the Public Use Bar?
Because of the free flow into the laboratory in which Suaudeau
housed the invention, one can easily conclude that individuals enter-
ing the lab believed the invention to be available to the public. Indi-
viduals actually saw the centrifuge while in operation, 67 which most
likely allowed them to acquire a greater knowledge of the invention
than if it had been idle. The inventor of the centrifuge used by Su-
audeau did not immediately attempt to patent the invention, even
163. See supra Part IV.
164. Baxter Int'l, 88 F.3d at 1058; see also supra Parts V.C.1-2.
165. Baxter Int'l, 88 F.3d at 1060; see also supra Part V.C.2.
166. Baxter Int'l, 88 F.3d at 1060.
167. Id. at 1058.
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though the invention worked for its intended purpose, 168 therefore the
public did not gain access to the information at the earliest possible
date. The policy of prompt and widespread disclosure is not upheld if
the inventor delays filing a patent application for no apparent reason.
The policy of not allowing an inventor to commercially exploit an
invention for a period of time greater than that which is statutorily
prescribed does not play a role in this case. Finally, the finding of an
invalidating public use in Baxter Int'l does not go against the policy of
allowing an inventor time to determine whether an invention is worth
patenting. The mere fact that Suaudeau found the sealless centrifuge,
developed by his colleague, to work much better than the centrifuge
previously used should have informed the inventor of the potential of
the sealless centrifuge. Neither the holding of the Federal Circuit nor
the outcome obtained using the proposed two-part test undermine
the underlying policy considerations of the 102(b) public use bar.
D. Discussion of Results Under the Proposed Test
The examples set forth above indicate that the 102(b) public use
bar is capable of some amount of uniformity. In both Moleculon Re-
search Corp. and Lough the inventor displayed and allowed others to
use the inventions at least one year prior to filing for patents. Al-
though the two cases differ in some ways, there are numerous simi-
larities that should yield the same legal outcome. Both inventors
allowed friends to either see the invention in use or to actually use the
invention; neither inventor was in the process of conducting any sort
of experimentation or testing on the inventions; and neither asked
those using the inventions to keep the information confidential.
169
Yet the Federal Circuit reached inconsistent conclusions: it found an
invalidating public use in Lough, but not in Moleculon Research
Corp. Applying the proposed two-part test, however, yields consis-
tent results. Baxter Int'l demonstrates that the proposed test does not
reach too far. The Federal Circuit has already held that mere visibil-
ity of an invention to someone beyond the inventor's direction consti-
tutes a public use.
168. Id. at 1056. Even without the public use bar, Ito erred by not filing a patent application
sooner because another, independent inventor, Cullis, filed an application for a sealless
centrifuge. Id.
169. Although the court, in Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., stated that the inventor
had an expectation of privacy, there was no indication that the inventor communicated that
expectation to those who either saw or used the invention, which was, at times, displayed on the
inventor's desk at work. 793 F.2d 1261, 1265-66 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
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The proposed test attempts to provide a bright-line rule, which
allows inventors to more easily conform any pre-filing activities so as
to avoid an invalidating public use. In each case presented above, it
would have been clear to the inventor, had each applied the proposed
test, that the actions taken amounted to invalidating public uses. In
each case it was clear that the inventor allowed a reduced-to-practice
invention to be used, or seen, by at least one person outside the in-
ventor's direction and control. Applying the proposed test to the
cases cited above may indicate that the Federal Circuit, many times, is
correct in its ultimate conclusions. However, it also points out that
inconsistency does exist. By eliminating the totality of the circum-
stances test and creating a test that is clearer, the court can arrive at
conclusions that are consistent and provide more uniformity and
clarity to the application of the 102(b) public use bar.
CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit, following the Supreme Court's holding in
Pfaff, has taken steps to add clarity to the application of the on-sale
bar under 102(b) by eliminating the totality of the circumstances test
and replacing it with a more specific two-part test. 170 The Federal
Circuit should take the same steps with respect to the public use bar
of 102(b). This Article proposes the following test for determining
when the one-year statutory grace period for the public use bar be-
gins: (1) there is any nonexperimental use by or visible to someone
other than the inventor or those under the inventor's direction; and
(2) the invention has been reduced to practice. This test provides a
more definite rule for determining whether an invalidating public use
has occurred, without undermining any of the four fundamental pol-
icy considerations underlying the 102(b) public use bar. Inventors
should find it easier to gauge pre-filing activities around this test so as
to avoid a later public use bar. The proposed test is also meant to
provide a higher degree of consistency and uniformity in the rationale
and holdings of cases that require the application of the 102(b) public
use bar.
170. See Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 67-68 (1998).
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